The New Era of Nuclear Proliferation: Challenges and Strategies

Sohn Yong-woo

Policy Committee Member at the Hansun Foundation

ywsohn21@naver.com

I. Introduction

II. First Generation Nuclear Proliferation

III. Second Generation Nuclear Proliferation

IV. Third Generation Nuclear Proliferation

V. Conclusion

I. Introduction

 On June 19th, North Korea and Russia signed a 'Comprehensive Strategic Partnership' agreement. This revives the '1961 Soviet-North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance' which had been nullified in 1996 due to Russia's circumstances. Putin, dreaming of the glory of the empire, and Kim Jong-un, longing for eternal dictatorship, have restored an alliance with an automatic military intervention clause in preparation for a major war. Stalin's ghost, which recognized Kim Il-sung's unification by force as part of a communist strategy amidst the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, has now been passed on to Putin and eventually to Kim Jong-un.

 North Korea is currently estimated to possess between 50 and 100 nuclear weapons. Without the Soviet Union's support for nuclear development agreed upon in the mid-1950s, today's North Korean nuclear armament would not have been possible. North Korea's next goals are to advance its nuclear weapon systems, increase its nuclear arsenal, and, like Pakistan, gain international recognition as a de facto nuclear state to escape sanctions. This dream has partially been realized with the recent North Korea-Russia treaty. Given the contents of the treaty, the term 'strategic partnership' has a different meaning from that of the liberal world. It appears that Russia has recognized North Korea as a strategic buffer state with nuclear capabilities through this treaty to shift the nuclear balance in Northeast Asia in favor of the northern bloc.

 Non-nuclear-weapon states such as South Korea and Japan have alliances with the nuclear-weapon state, the United States. North Korea, a nuclear-weapon state, has alliances with other nuclear-weapon states, China and Russia. The nuclear asymmetry is disrupting the nuclear balance in Northeast Asia, leading to significant changes in the balance of power and the offensive-defensive balance.

 The world is now entering a new era of nuclear proliferation, with Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe being areas of concern. In the hot zone of the Middle East, Israel is the only nuclear-weapon state, prompting adversaries like Iran, Iraq, and Syria to aspire for nuclear proliferation. With the prolonged Ukraine war and Russia's escalating nuclear threats, NATO member states in Europe are increasingly longing for their own nuclear arsenals beyond shared nuclear capabilities with the United States. It is anticipated that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which forms the foundation of the exclusive nuclear privilege in the international community, will be shaken to its core.

 The history of nuclear proliferation can be broadly divided into three generations. The first generation saw the establishment of the NPT regime in 1970, securing nuclear monopoly by the U.S. and Soviet Union, followed by the U.K., France, and China. The second generation involved nuclear proliferation by non-NPT member states like Israel, India, and Pakistan, as well as North Korea, which illegally withdrew from the NPT. The third generation involves the current and near-future potential nuclear domino effects centered around Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

II. First Generation Nuclear Proliferation

 The United States completed the 'Manhattan Project' in 1945, inaugurating the nuclear weapon era. That year, the U.S. deployed nuclear weapons against non-nuclear combatant Japan, resulting in immediate surrender. Since then, nuclear weapons have divided the history of warfare into pre- and post-nuclear eras, becoming the most potent existential force in international politics. As Bernard Brodie termed it, the 'absolute weapon' of nuclear arms provides 'nuclear deterrence' for security and 'nuclear terror' for politics. Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) operates when both sides possess nuclear weapons, creating a 'balance of terror.' The nuclear triad?long-range bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)?forms the core foundation of MAD. Consequently, it was presumed that no nation could win a nuclear war, reducing the likelihood of such a war to zero. John Lewis Gaddis assessed that while nuclear weapons deepened the Cold War, the MAD doctrine contributed to the 'long peace' of the Cold War era, thereby somewhat proving the effectiveness of nuclear doctrine.

 Following the U.S., the first generation of nuclear proliferation included the Soviet Union (1949), the U.K. (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). The U.K. and France pursued independent nuclear proliferation to counter the Soviet nuclear threat. French President Charles de Gaulle famously remarked, "A country without nuclear weapons is not truly independent... Can the U.S. abandon New York to defend Paris?" China pursued a nuclear strategy of securing atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, and satellites simultaneously, known as the 'Two Bombs, One Satellite' (??一星) strategy. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping expressed grand pride in nuclear weapons, stating, "If we had not developed atomic and hydrogen bombs and launched satellites, China would not have the international voice it has today." The first generation nuclear proliferators are permanent members of the UN Security Council, maintaining an exclusive nuclear club cartel, leading to the most unequal international treaty, the NPT, established in 1970.

III. Second Generation Nuclear Proliferation

 The second generation of nuclear proliferation encompasses the era when non-NPT member states such as Israel, India, and Pakistan acquired nuclear weapons. These states chose nuclear armament as a national security strategy from the outset, hence they did not join the NPT. Additionally, this generation includes North Korea, which illegally withdrew from the NPT. Except for North Korea, second-generation nuclear proliferators are recognized as de facto nuclear states by the international community, a status enabled by their non-NPT membership. As such, these states are not formally recognized as nuclear-weapon states within the normative framework of the NPT and international politics. North Korea, due to its criminal status as an NPT defector, cannot even achieve de facto nuclear-weapon state status politically. However, militarily and technologically, North Korea is undeniably a nuclear-weapon state. Thus, annual reports by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and various international security organizations rank North Korea as the 9th nuclear-weapon state, following Pakistan.

 Israel is the sixth country globally and the first in the Middle East to possess nuclear weapons. Israel, uniquely among nuclear-weapon states, has not conducted overt nuclear tests but is assessed to have completed operational deployment of nuclear weapons by the early 1970s. Israel consistently maintains a policy of strategic nuclear ambiguity (NCND: Neither Confirm Nor Deny). Due to the geopolitical importance of the Middle East, the U.S. actively permits Israel's nuclear armament.

 India's motivation for nuclear development stemmed from the nuclear threat posed by neighboring hostile state China. India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974. In the 1980s, as another neighboring hostile state, Pakistan, emerged as a threat, India further bolstered its nuclear armament. India conducted two nuclear tests in 1998 and promptly declared possession of 'credible minimum deterrence.' Given India's geopolitical significance in the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific strategy and China containment policy, the U.S. provides special treatment for India's nuclear armament. The two countries signed the 'Civil Nuclear Agreement' in 2005, allowing India to receive civilian nuclear technology and fuel from the U.S., which the international community views as the U.S. recognizing India's nuclear-weapon state status.

 Pakistan's nuclear armament was driven by a strategy to balance fear with India. Led by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the 'father of the nuclear bomb,' Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998. Pakistan primarily relies on uranium enrichment, enabling covert nuclear development. This technology is known to have flowed into North Korea's uranium nuclear development in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Nevertheless, post-9/11, the U.S., needing a military base for the war on terror, has tacitly accepted Pakistan's nuclear possession. North Korea aspires to follow Pakistan's model of strategic utilization of its adversarial coexistence with the U.S.

 In summary, China's substantive nuclear threat directly influenced India's nuclear development, which in turn spurred Pakistan's nuclear armament, further providing incentives for anti-American Islamic states like Iran, Iraq, and Syria to develop nuclear capabilities. A continental 'nuclear domino' phenomenon, from Asia to the Middle East, is thus occurring.

North Korea holds a unique status among second-generation nuclear states. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, persuaded by the Soviet Union, as a deception tactic for nuclear development, but declared its withdrawal in 1993 to pursue full-scale nuclear armament, initiating the 30-year

North Korean nuclear crisis. After initially deferring its withdrawal under the first North Korean nuclear negotiations, North Korea completely withdrew in 2003, resulting in triple sanctions from the UN, NPT, and the U.S. North Korea, being legally penalized under nuclear proliferation norms, finds it politically impossible to achieve nuclear-weapon state status despite its technical possession of nuclear weapons. North Korea has persistently sought bilateral talks with the U.S. to gain recognition akin to Pakistan's, but all attempts, such as the Singapore (2018) and Hanoi (2019) summits, have failed.

 The emergence of second-generation nuclear-weapon states has sparked debates about the stability of the international nuclear order. Geopolitical disputes and conflicts in the Middle East and Asia are exacerbating regional nuclear proliferation and nuclear arms races. As Scott D. Sagan argues, the characteristics of emerging nuclear-armed states, such as military or authoritarian political systems, political instability, and proximity to hostile nations, increase the perceived risk and instability associated with nuclear proliferation, rather than enhancing stability.

IV. Third Generation Nuclear Proliferation

 The dawn of third-generation nuclear proliferation has begun. Since the late 1990s, Russia has expressed the possibility of using nuclear weapons against NATO through its military doctrine. In 2020, Russia announced a new nuclear deterrence policy, reaffirming that it could use nuclear weapons in response to large-scale conventional or nuclear attacks on itself or its allies. Paradoxically, Putin's invasion of Ukraine and nuclear threats and blackmail against NATO member states have provided justification for the argument in favor of nuclear armament in Western Europe. Although NATO, under its nuclear sharing program with the United States, has dispersed around 150 nuclear weapons across five countries, the final decision on their use rests with Washington, posing a limitation. Thus, in response to Russia's nuclear threats, it is expected that NATO member states' demands for their own nuclear armament will intensify.

 The nuclear domino effect in the Middle East is also noteworthy. Israel's possession of nuclear weapons has prompted anti-American and anti-Israeli states to seek nuclear balance. In the early 2010s, Israel attempted to attack Iran's nuclear facilities to thwart Iran's nuclear development, which threatened its security. However, this was thwarted by the United States, leading to the 2015 nuclear deal between the U.S. and Iran. Yet, with the Trump administration's unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement in 2018, Iran's unrestricted nuclear development is nearing completion. Iran's nuclear armament will provoke Saudi Arabia, its adversary, to seek nuclear capabilities as well. Additionally, failed nuclear developers like Iraq and Syria might also pursue nuclear armament again. If a nuclear war between nuclear-armed states were to occur, the Middle East is the most likely region, as it is the area with the greatest instability in nuclear proliferation, hostile anarchy, and aggressive security dilemmas.

 Northeast Asia, where the liberal bloc and the authoritarian bloc collide, is the region where the new Cold War is most intensely at work. The aggressive stance of nuclear power Russia, which has embarked on becoming a war criminal state, is emerging as a new variable. If Russia's invasion of Ukraine was an ambition to change the geopolitical structure of Europe, the recent North Korea-Russia treaty indicates an intention to fully participate in the new Cold War game within the region and influence the balance of power. The crux of this is the nuclear balance in Northeast Asia. The completely nuclear-armed bloc of North Korea, China, and Russia versus the incompletely nuclear-armed bloc of South Korea, the United States, and Japan creates an uneven playing field. No matter how strong the U.S. nuclear power is, it cannot match the combined nuclear forces of Russia and China. If North Korea's nuclear capabilities surpass those of Pakistan with Russia's support, the nuclear balance, the offensive-defense balance, and the balance of power in Northeast Asia will all collapse. This is the hidden strategy behind the recent North Korea-Russia treaty and the greatest challenge and task facing South Korea, the United States, and Japan.

V. Conclusion

 Humanity has faced the judgment of fate, experiencing the rise and fall of civilizations, whenever wars broke out. The tribes and nations with stronger weapons emerged victorious. Currently, humanity lives in the nuclear age, and an era of nuclear AI may soon unfold. The "Skynet Project" from the movie Terminator could become a reality, potentially leading to the extinction of humankind. Although this is an extreme vision of the future, those with nuclear weapons will triumph, while those without will have to rely on or beg for the mercy of those who do.

 Kenneth N. Waltz stated the truth of international politics: "In an anarchic international system, states pursue nuclear weapons as a means of self-help, and no one can prevent them from doing so." Due to the anarchic nature of the international system, states seek nuclear weapons to protect their own security and deter other nations.

 The core of nuclear deterrence theory is that nuclear war can only be prevented when both sides possess nuclear capabilities, including both first-strike and second-strike capabilities, that can mutually assure destruction. Brodie pointed out the importance of strategic thinking by saying, "Nuclear weapons are only useful when they are not used." This underscores the deterrent power of nuclear weapons, where their primary purpose is not actual use, but to deter war and maintain peace through the threat of use.

 However, when the nuclear balance between both sides is disrupted, this deterrence theory becomes difficult to apply. This is the reality currently unfolding in Northeast Asia. The inferiority of the nuclear balance between South Korea, the United States, and Japan provides aggressive authoritarian states like North Korea, China, and Russia with an incentive for a nuclear attack. This is why a strategic nuclear balance in Northeast Asia is necessary. Northeast Asia is facing an era of the hottest nuclear arms race on Earth, with both horizontal nuclear proliferation, or the emergence of new nuclear-armed states such as South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan ("N+1 problem"), and vertical nuclear proliferation, or the qualitative advancement of nuclear weapons by existing nuclear states like the United States, China, Russia, and North Korea, occurring simultaneously.

 What measures should South Korea adopt in the face of this new challenge of nuclear proliferation? The limitations of the U.S. nuclear umbrella were pointed out half a century ago by President De Gaulle: "Would the United States sacrifice New York to protect Seoul?" This fundamental question remains relevant. Considering South Korea's nuclear armament option as a last resort after strengthening nuclear extended deterrence, NATO-style nuclear sharing, and redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons is now a futile waste of time and a dangerous gamble. Discussing North Korea's denuclearization is now foolish, and talking about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is even more naive. It is time to explore South Korea's survival nuclear balance against North Korea through strategic nuclear thinking, as well as a strategic nuclear balance against the North Korea-China-Russia bloc in the region. We should re-examine the historical "nuclear armament project" of President Park Chung-hee, who had the foresight and insight to take decisive steps toward nuclear armament with courage and determination in the nuclear age. Peace built on humiliation from enemy states or relying on the mercy of powerful nations is not true peace. It is time to create strong peace through independent power.

References

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