Hansun Policy Report 2023-E2 March 22, 2023 

Time to Think about Deterrence Failure 

on North Korea

Hwee-Rhak Park, 

Chairman, Nuclear Preparedness Committee, Hansun Foundation

hweerhakpark@gmail.com

Recently, North Korea increased its tone of nuclear threat toward the United States and South Korea. It fired an international ballistic missile (ICBM) to threaten the United States on March 16, 2023. Then, it launched a short-range ballistic missile, KN-23, tipped with a mock nuclear warhead, to threaten South Korea on March 19. It claimed that the warhead of the missile was exploded at 800 meters in mid-air, which is known as the optimal height to maximize the killing power of a nuclear bomb, as a drill for a tactical nuclear missile attack on South Korea.

Especially, North Korea has been emphasizing its "second mission," which seems to be its reunification war against South Korea since the beginning of 2022. The emphasis could mean that North Korea thinks it can block the U.S.’ extended deterrence, also known as the nuclear umbrella, for South Korea by threatening to attack U.S. cities on the mainland with its ICBMs. This seems to be its "first mission." The fact that North Korea moved from its first mission to its second mission means that the current deterrence strategy and posture of the United States and South Korea seem to be not functioning as expected. It may be time for the United States and South Korea to discuss the possibility of "deterrence failure" against North Korea.

Deterrence Success versus Deterrence Failure

We have always discussed "deterrence success" and the improvement of deterrence posture and tried not to talk about a nuclear war, which could be catastrophic beyond imagination. We intentionally avoided any discussion on the possibility of a nuclear war and the possible failure of the current deterrence strategy and posture. Most nuclear states, especially democratic states, even heightened their nuclear threshold by announcing their no-first-use policy on nuclear weapons.

However, war can be initiated by one side. If one side believes that nuclear war is "not an inconceivable event" and that the exchange of nuclear attacks "would not be the end of the world," nuclear war could occur. In this sense, we need to pay more attention to "deterrence failure" to connect deterrence with war when a nuclear state that has the above belief in nuclear war emerges. The conceptual differentiation between deterrence success, deterrence failure, and war studies is explained in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Conceptual Differences Among Deterrence Related Terms

As illustrated in Figure 1, the success of deterrence (illustrated by a shield) focuses on deterrent measures with the minimum interest in war (illustrated by an explosion), whereas war studies focus on warfighting with the minimum interest in deterrence. In contrast, discussions on deterrence failure put generally equal weight on deterrence and war and focus on the prevention of war. As the threat of nuclear war grows, we need to increase discussions about deterrence failure. Otherwise, our deterrence efforts would become complacent, and we might repent after being surprised by a nuclear war.

The Possibility of Deterrence Failure

We could identify several factors that may cause deterrence failure. The set of factors could vary depending on the perspectives of scholars. This author drew five factors that could affect the decisions of the challenger for the initiation of nuclear war from theories of deterrence and war: 1) the retaliation posture of the deterrer; 2) the credibility of the deterrer’s retaliation; 3) the probability of the challenger’s success; 4) the challenger’s irrational leader; 5) the challenger’s situational desperateness. Although these factors should be adjusted to the specific situation of a target country, they could be the basic set of factors to be used when we have to assess the possibility of deterrence failure and find prescriptions to reduce that possibility. Let us apply these factors to current North Korea.

1) The retaliation posture of the United States: Although North Korea has made tremendous efforts, its current nuclear capabilities are nowhere close to those of the United States. However, most U.S. nuclear weapons are strategic for use against Russia and China and may not be appropriate to be used against North Korea. The United States has a limited number of tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons and has decided not to strengthen its non-strategic nuclear bombs for potential use against North Korea. North Korean leaders might think that they can dominate the United States for the time being in terms of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

2) The credibility of U.S.’ retaliation: North Korean leaders may believe that the United States can hardly implement its extended deterrence promise to South Korea because they can attack U.S. cities with their ICBMs for retaliation. Suppose one North Korean nuclear missile evades U.S. missile defense systems; the United States would have to risk the total destruction of its cities. Modern hydrogen bombs that North Korea managed to develop could destroy a megacity with a bomb. As a result, even a small nuclear state like North Korea could deter a nuclear superpower like the United States by threatening a nuclear attack on the superpower’s megacity. That could be the reason why North Korea came to think that its first mission is almost accomplished and it is time for its second mission.

3) The probability of North Korea’s success: Regarding their victory in a potential reunification war against South Korea, North Korean leaders have continuously discussed their operational plans since their discussion of the “seven-day war plan” in 2013. If the United States does not provide the nuclear umbrella and North Korea combines conventional forces with nuclear weapons effectively, it would not be that difficult for North Korea to defeat South Korean forces in a week, as implied by the plan’s title. If North Korea uses several nuclear weapons in the initial stage of war, South Korea can hardly have any chance for a counteroffensive.

4) North Korea’s irrational leaders: North Korean leaders cannot have an active exchange of information for rational decision-making because of their isolation from the world, dynastic political structure, and centralized order-and-execution culture. Actually, Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s supreme leader, has been evaluated as having several irrational personal traits, such as "a combination of narcissism and Machiavellianism." From the standpoint of rational people, it will be very difficult for North Korean leaders to decide in favor of nuclear war because they would have to risk both their own survival and the regime's survival. However, North Korean leaders may have totally different thinking mechanisms from the rational actor model. Some people could evaluate North Korea’s escalatory rhetoric as a bluff, but we cannot risk our national security based on our wishful thinking.

5) North Korea’s situational desperateness: North Korea faces severe economic difficulties. The industrial capital stock of North Korea is evaluated to be nearly irreparable due to decades of mismanagement, underinvestment, shortages of spare parts, and inadequate maintenance. North Korea has been subject to continuous and severe UN sanctions as punishment for its nuclear armament. North Korea has a serious food shortage. North Korea may not be able to survive without taking advantage of its only power, its nuclear weapons. North Korea could feel that it has little to lose.

The overall assessment of the possibility of deterrence failure against North Korea appears to be very concerning. The U.S.’ nuclear dominance on the Korean Peninsula has diminished because of North Korea’s continuous nuclear buildup. The credibility of U.S. extended deterrence has been reduced due to North Korea’s nuclear capabilities to attack U.S. cities. North Korean leaders may believe they could block the U.S.’ nuclear retaliation by threatening to attack a few U.S. cities with nuclear weapons and could attack and annex the non-nuclear South Korea easily by implementing their “seven-day war plan.” The North Korean leaders seem more irrational than normal leaders of democratic countries and desperate enough to make risky decisions. It may be necessary for the United States and South Korea to look at the current situation from the perspective of deterrence failure and take steps to reduce the likelihood of it.

Implications

The United States and South Korea need to recognize that North Korea may not be deterred by the conventional logic of deterrence, i.e., a threat to inflict more cost than benefit. North Korean leaders’ decisions could be predetermined by their ideology and political structure regardless of the U.S.’ threat of severe cost. The policymakers of the United States and South Korea should try to analyze North Korea as it is and come up with more tailored deterrence strategies and policies regarding North Korea. At least, they need to consider a bigger safety margin than the deterrence approach against other nuclear states.

As an immediate and practical task to prevent a deterrence failure against North Korea, the militaries of the United States and South Korea should strengthen their consultation mechanisms for U.S. extended deterrence, such as the Deterrence Strategy Committee. They need to expand this organization to serve as the command post to evaluate the nuclear deterrence postures of the two allies and prevent their deterrence failure against North Korea. They could expand this organization to serve as the Nuclear Planning Group that has been functioning in NATO by including other allies in the region. They should also demand the commander of the United States-South Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC) develop new operational plans and conduct combined exercises to prepare for nuclear warfighting. In addition, if North Korea becomes more aggressive in its nuclear policies and threats, the two allies should deploy and maintain some of the U.S. strategic assets near the Korean Peninsula to increase the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The United States and South Korean policymakers should improve their “strategic communication” with North Korean leaders to reduce the leaders' irrationality, misperception, and miscalculation. The content and methods of strategic communication should be sophisticated enough to ensure their deterrent effects. At least, they should increase the frequency and size of demonstrations of their retaliation forces against North Korea. At the same time, they should try to do more to lead North Korean leaders to open North Korea to the outside world while strengthening their deterrence postures to make North Korean leaders feel that any nuclear attack on South Korea will result in, as the United States and South Korea have openly warned these days, “the end of the North Korean regime.” (This commentary is a summary of the following research article: Park, Hwee-Rhak (2023). The Necessity to Discuss ‘Deterrence Failure’ Regarding North Korea’s Nuclear Threat. International Studies, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00208817231154389)