Hansun Policy Report 2023-E1 February 7, 2023 

What Should the United States Do to Dissuade South Koreans 

from Developing Nuclear Weapons?

Hwee-Rhak Park, 

Chairman, Nuclear Preparedness Committee, Hansun Foundation

hweerhakpark@gmail.com

North Korea's Growing Nuclear Threat

The United States has a considerable distance from North Korea. As the world policeman, the United States has to deal with various threats from the international community, so the sense of urgency against the North Korean threat cannot help but be less severe than that of South Korea. For the United States, the North Korean nuclear threat cannot decisively threaten the country’s vital national interests and is just one of many issues in the world. For South Korea, in contrast, it is a life-and-death issue that threatens the existence of the country.

By any standard, the North Korean nuclear threat has come to be very serious. It is usually said that North Korea possesses between 20 and 60 nuclear weapons, but these numbers have no basis. Because of the extreme isolation of North Korea and the absolute secrecy surrounding the issue, it is impossible to know the exact size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The American Scientists Association, for example, assessed 40 in 2021 and reduced it to 20 in 2022.

There have been a few reports that estimated the size of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal through the number of centrifuges that it could have. In April 2021, the U.S. Rand Institute and South Korea's Asan Institute of Policy Studies jointly published a research report on North Korea's nuclear threat. The report estimated that North Korea possessed between 67 and 116 nuclear weapons as of 2020. It also estimated that North Korea was capable of producing 12 to 18 nuclear weapons each year and was expected to possess 151 to 242 nuclear weapons by 2027. Dr. Siegfried Hecker, who personally visited North Korea and saw some of that country’s nuclear facilities, analyzed that North Korea could possess a considerable number of nuclear weapons, though a little fewer than the estimates of Rand and Asan. A South Korean scholar even calculated that North Korea possessed enough nuclear material to make between 200 and 400 nuclear weapons, based on the number of uranium centrifuges that it had.

More seriously, North Korea has the means to deliver these nuclear weapons and attack the United States. North Korea has developed and possesses the Hwasong-15, 16, and 17 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and is currently pursuing the development of large-sized ICBMs that can mount multiple warheads using solid fuel. It developed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) such as Pukguksong-3, 4, and 5, and not only completed a 3,000-ton submarine capable of transporting them but also started developing a nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN) in 2021. It was also able to make modern short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) like the KN-23, 24, and 25, which can attack South Korea without being intercepted.

North Korea's Minimal Deterrence Strategy: "The First Mission"

North Korea's nuclear strategy toward the United States is a strategy of minimal deterrence. This was the strategy used by France and the United Kingdom against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The two countries believed that they could deter the Soviet Union’s nuclear attack by threatening to destroy a few key Soviet cities because the Soviet Union would not trade the destruction of its cities for the annihilation of France or the United Kingdom. Therefore, the two countries have developed most of their nuclear weapons as the type of SLBMs for their second strike against the Soviet Union and transported them on four SSBNs to ensure at least one SSBN always stays in the ocean for the second strike. Like France and the United Kingdom, North Korea threatens to destroy a few key U.S. cities with nuclear weapons, even risking its own destruction. If the minimal deterrence strategy of France and the United Kingdom worked against the Soviet Union in the Cold War era or is working against Russia now, the minimal deterrence strategy of North Korea against the United States could work, too.

In fact, North Korea has tried to have nuclear capabilities to block the implementation of the U.S. nuclear extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, naming it as its "first mission." It did not stop at possessing atomic bombs to defend itself but moved further to develop hydrogen bombs, ICBMs, and SLBMs to attack the United States. After successfully developing his first ICBM, the Hwasong-15, in November 2017, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that his country had completed its nuclear force. In his New Year's address on January 1, 2018, he even emphasized that the button for an attack on the U.S. mainland was on his desk.

"The Second Mission" of North Korea

Recently, North Korean leaders seemed to have evaluated that they had the considerable capabilities necessary to achieve their first mission. Now, they are emphasizing their "second mission," which is to attack and annex South Korea. They intend to launch an attack on South Korea using nuclear weapons and conventional forces in order to achieve total Korean reunification, which they attempted in 1950 by invading South Korea with conventional forces. Shortly after developing its first nuclear weapon, an atomic bomb, in 2013, they discussed the "seven-day war" plan, which was to take over South Korea within a week.

In 2019, when North Korean leaders managed to have a minimum level of hydrogen bombs, ICBMs, and SLBMs to attack the United States, North Korea began testing various SRBMs to attack South Korea. They intensively tested SRBMs such as the KN-23, KN-24, and KN-25, which could be launched instantly and avoid South Korea’s missile defense systems by performing a pull-up maneuver in the terminal stage or flying at low altitude. North Korea has even demonstrated the ability to transport missiles by railroad or conceal them underwater in reservoirs.

Having secured the necessary capabilities to attack South Korea with nuclear weapons, North Korean leaders began to reveal their intention to attack South Korea in early 2022. In April 2022, Kim Jong-un ordered the North Korean military to be fully prepared for a reunification war against South Korea, that is, to "resolutely complete the second mission." In July, he even threatened to destroy the South Korean forces with nuclear weapons. In September, he amended the law on the use of nuclear weapons so that he could use them whenever he wanted. In October and November, he showed off large-scale air and missile forces in response to the U.S.-South Korean combined air force drills. In December, he declared at a party plenary meeting that "South Korea is without a doubt the clear enemy of North Korea" and that his country will mass-produce nuclear weapons in preparation for an attack on South Korea.

In particular, the contents of North Korea’s law on the use of nuclear weapons, which was amended on September 8, 2022, clearly demonstrated North Korea's will to attack South Korea. North Korea clarified that the mission of its nuclear weapons is to ensure the "territorial integrity" of North Korea. In other words, North Korea developed its nuclear weapons to reunify the whole of Korea on its terms. It even set up five situations in which nuclear weapons could be used, like when a non-nuclear attack is imminent or when operational needs require it. The North Korea’s nuclear threshold seems to be very low. The joint reports by the Rand and the Asan, which were introduced before, predicted that North Korea would use 40?60 nuclear weapons in the early stages of its attack on South Korea.

The author would like to pose a few questions to U.S. officials and scholars. What would you do if you were the leader of South Korea under this kind of serious North Korean nuclear threat? Would you not ask the United States to further strengthen extended deterrence? (The United States prefers the term "extended deterrence" over "nuclear umbrella" in order to maintain flexibility. However, conventional extended deterrence can hardly have a sufficient nuclear deterrence effect. So, the author would like to use the term "nuclear umbrella" in this article to ensure the involvement of nuclear weapons in the U.S. extended deterrence). If the United States does not come up with concrete measures to guarantee the nuclear umbrella, would you not consider having your own nuclear weapons? The United States failed to keep its promise to South Vietnam in 1975 and withdrew its forces from Syria in 2019 without consulting its Kurdish allies. In 2022, it unilaterally withdrew from Afghanistan, which it had supported for several years. Can anyone be sure that this history will not be repeated in Korea?

Discussions for Nuclear Armament in South Korea

Whenever the North Korean nuclear threat became serious, the demand for nuclear armament was raised in South Korea. As North Korea emphasizes its "second mission," the demand for nuclear armament resumes in South Korea. Now, even President Yoon Seok-yeol has participated in the demand. On January 11, 2023, while receiving a report on how to defend his country from the North Korean nuclear threat from the Ministry of National Defense, he said, "If the North Korean nuclear threat becomes more serious, we may need to consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons from the United States or possessing nuclear weapons ourselves." In an opinion poll on January 30 in South Korea, 76.6% of respondents said that their country needs to develop its own nuclear weapons. A number of South Korean security experts are also emphasizing the need for nuclear armament.

The South Korean people's motive for insisting on nuclear armament is simple: common sense suggests that no country would expose its cities to the threat of nuclear attack in order to protect its allies. They are well aware that North Korea will immediately use nuclear weapons against South Korea if it comes to believe that the reunification of Korea on its terms is achievable. They remember that the United States made a unilateral decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Korea in the 1970s and 1990s, and therefore think that it is highly likely that the U.S. nuclear umbrella will not be provided when North Korea threatens to attack the U.S. mainland with its ICBMs and/or SLBMs. They believe that the best way to respond to the current North Korean nuclear threat is to establish a nuclear balance between the two Koreas, like India and Pakistan.

Some South Korean politicians raised this nuclear armament demand to force the United States to take more robust measures to ensure the implementation of the nuclear umbrella in a real crisis. They believe that if the United States wants to dissuade South Korea from developing nuclear weapons, it must redeploy its nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula, as it did during the Cold War. Not just one or two, but a sizable number of South Korean politicians share this opinion.

U.S. Position on South Korea's Nuclear Armament

Needless to say, the U.S. government opposes South Korea's nuclear armament. As a country that should advocate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the United States cannot allow the development of nuclear weapons by South Korea because nuclear non-proliferation is their official policy. The domino effects of nuclear proliferation will be more serious than dealing with the current North Korean nuclear threat. The U.S. government should pursue the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. As a result, U.S. officials have no choice but to ask the South Korean government and people to trust their country’s nuclear umbrella promise.

Several Korea experts in the United States are criticizing South Korea's demand for nuclear weapons for a variety of reasons. Some scholars have expressed confusion or displeasure at South Korea's distrust of U.S. nuclear umbrella promises or concerns that President Yoon could follow President Park Chung-hee’s path to develop nuclear weapons in the 1970s. Some former U.S. government officials warned that South Korea's demand for nuclear armament is an insult to the United States and that South Korea's nuclear armament will pay a heavy price. Others worry that if South Korea pursues nuclear weapons development, it would suffer significant losses from international sanctions.

However, the United States has not taken any practical measures to really increase the credibility of its nuclear umbrella promise. It promised to deploy the strategic assets of its military in a timely manner and in consultation with South Korea. It emphasized that the U.S. and South Korean forces would conduct exercises under the assumption that North Korea would attack South Korea with nuclear weapons. At the end of January 2023, the U.S. Secretary of Defense visited South Korea to persuade South Korean leaders not to discuss the nuclear armament option, but no additional measures were proposed. President Yoon directly asked the Defense Secretary to develop practical measures to increase the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, but the United States only responded by deploying the strategic bomber B-1B once. When President Yoon said that South Korean forces would participate in the planning of the use of U.S. nuclear weapons in order to tone down the South Korean people’s demand for nuclear armament, U.S. President Biden flatly denied this.

Again, this author would like to repeat the same questions to U.S. officials and scholars. In the current situation, where the North Korean nuclear threat has become very serious and the U.S. promise of a nuclear umbrella has not been strengthened, what would you do if you were the leader of South Korea? Would you not think of developing nuclear weapons?

After hearing that Russia might use nuclear weapons against Ukraine, Poland demanded that the United States deploy nuclear weapons in Poland. This was because the U.S.'s verbal commitment to the nuclear umbrella was thought to be insufficient. The reason why the United States has forward-deployed nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is that it judged that the deterrence effect of verbal commitment to the nuclear umbrella was insufficient. Asking South Korea not to worry about the U.S. nuclear umbrella promise without taking any practically effective measures, such as the measures taken by the United States in NATO, may indicate that the United States views South Korea as a less important ally than its NATO allies.

The United States needs to try to understand South Korea's anxiety over the North Korean nuclear threat. A significant number of South Koreans experienced the North Koreans’ rule during the Korean War in 1950?1953, and generations after that also heard stories about it. In 1987, North Korea blew up a Korean Air plane in the air, killing all 115 passengers and crew members. North Korea frequently infiltrated its armed commandos into South Korea and killed South Koreans. In 2020, it sank a South Korean warship and bombarded Yeonpyeong Island, which is South Korean territory. How can the South Korean people feel at ease when such a cruel North Korean regime possesses nuclear weapons?

The South Korean government, scholars, and citizens fully understand the risks and side effects of developing their own nuclear weapons. Internationally, the NPT system is so solid that they know that it is not easy for them to develop nuclear weapons on their own. They know that trying to develop nuclear weapons could jeopardize their alliance with the United States. They know that it is not easy to acquire plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which are essential for nuclear weapons development. They also know that if South Korea decides to arm itself with nuclear weapons, there is a high possibility that North Korea will launch a preventive attack to block it. Nevertheless, the demand that South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons erupted because of the seriousness of the current situation, which outweighs the risks or side effects above mentioned.

Ensuring the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella

The United States should not only ask South Korea to trust the U.S. nuclear umbrella but should come up with measures that will make South Koreans trust it. As one of those measures, the United States should increase in-depth discussions with the South Korean government on matters related to the North Korean nuclear threat. Not only the president but also the national security adviser, the secretaries of state and defense, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency must frequently consult with their South Korean counterparts on the North Korean nuclear threat. When it comes to the North Korean nuclear threat and necessary measures to handle it, the two allies should share all related information, concerns, and successes.

The organizations that are tasked with discussing the implementation of the nuclear umbrella at the working level are the Extended Deterrence Strategy Consultation Group (EDSCG) between diplomats and the Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC) between the militaries of the United States and South Korea. Needless to say, the United States should do everything possible to make these organizations more active than they are now. Instead of meeting on an ad hoc basis or as a symbolic gesture, the US may need to reinforce the DSC as a permanent organization to ensure continuous discussions on the North Korean nuclear threat 365 days a year. It could be useful to move the venue of this committee to Guam and to make Japan and other allies participate. If the North Korean nuclear threat worsens, the United States and South Korea must agree on the necessity of expanding this organization to the level of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group.

The U.S. government needs to order the United States-South Korea Combined Forces Command (CFC), which is led by the U.S. general, to develop more active and practical measures to respond to possible North Korean nuclear provocations. Since the U.S. general, who wears a double hat as the commander of the U.S. Forces in South Korea (USFK), is supposed to perform the practical jobs in implementing the U.S. nuclear umbrella for South Korea. In fact, the U.S. general also serves as the commander of the United Nations Command (UNC), which has been tasked by the United Nations to deter war on the Korean Peninsula and win the war if deterrence fails. The U.S. government should ask the commander of the CFC/USFK/UNC to be fully prepared for the accurate and instantaneous execution of the nuclear umbrella if the U.S. president decides. It should instruct the commander to rapidly revise his operational plan to deal with a possible North Korean nuclear attack and to conduct exercises based on the revised operational plan. It is also necessary to establish a combined task force in the CFC to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat during peacetime.

However, these measures to ensure the U.S. nuclear umbrella can hardly be sufficient to make the South Korean people fully trust the U.S.’s commitment. All the preparatory measures could become useless once the U.S. president decides not to implement his country’s nuclear umbrella promise to South Korea at the last minute. This is why South Korean policymakers and security experts demand more reassuring measures such as the nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO.

Establishment of Another Nuclear Sharing Arrangement

Because most security experts in South Korea are well aware of the serious side effects of developing its own nuclear weapons, they have long demanded the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons as the most realistic option to deter North Korea’s nuclear attack. The term "re-deployment" was also used to demand the repetition of the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula as the United States did during the Cold War. Late in 2019, the South Korean conservative opposition party, which is now the ruling party, adopted the nuclear sharing arrangement with the United States, like NATO's case, as the solution and put the option in the party platform.

Actually, when it comes to the nuclear umbrella, the location of nuclear weapons is unimportant as long as the United States is determined to keep its promise. The United States has a massive arsenal of ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers to launch massive retaliation immediately following the President's decision to do so. However, like the forward deployment of conventional forces, it is clear that the deterrence effect increases as the U.S. nuclear weapons are deployed close to North Korea. If the United States shares it with its allies, the deterrence effect will be greater, as in the case of NATO (The organization's nuclear sharing arrangement is not really a share but a consultation regarding the use of the deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States retains the final authority to decide the use of nuclear weapons).

In the United States, several defense experts have recommended the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons and the sharing of the deployed weapons as the only viable options to deal with the worsening North Korean nuclear threat. In 2019, right after denuclearization negotiations with North Korea had failed, several working-level officers of the U.S. Strategic Command recommended this option in an article that was published in Joint Forces Quarterly. Since then, a few retired military officers and former defense officials have joined the recommendation. In particular, Chuck Hagel, who was President Obama's Secretary of Defense, and a number of security experts from U.S. allies said that a NATO-like arrangement for sharing nuclear weapons should be set up in Northeast or East Asia, and that a NATO-like Nuclear Planning Group should be set up as a first step.

Within the United States, there is a mixture of opinions about whether the nuclear umbrella currently promised by the United States is sufficient and whether South Korea should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons or another nuclear sharing arrangement should be established. However, what needs to be noted is that those who advocate for South Korea’s nuclear armament are academics, whereas those who recommend the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons or the nuclear sharing arrangement are retired officers or those who worked in the defense area. In other words, people who know more about the reality of the situation surrounding North Korea's nuclear threat are pushing for an arrangement similar to NATO to be set up in Northeast Asia.

The U.S. government has not presented any official position on the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and the sharing of them. In late 2021, when South Korean presidential candidate Yoon Seok-yeol mentioned this option, former U.S. officials expressed negative opinions, saying that it was almost impossible to be realized due to opposition from Congress and the U.S. people. The U.S. Ambassador to Korea, who took office in January 2022, flatly rejected this option as risky.

This author would like to ask additional questions to U.S. officials and academics. How will the United States deter North Korea's nuclear attack if it rejects both South Korea’s nuclear armament option and the nuclear sharing option without sufficient practical measures to ensure its nuclear umbrella promise? Can the United States promise to fulfill its promise of a nuclear umbrella under any circumstances, including North Korea's threat to attack major cities on the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons? If not, the United States should inform South Korea of the lowered likelihood of its nuclear umbrella promise being fulfilled and ask South Korea to strengthen self-defensive measures against North Korea's nuclear threat. The horrible result regarding the nuclear umbrella promise will be the U.S.’s last-minute decision not to provide the umbrella. All the United States could face in the wake of the decision are a few criticisms from its allies. However, South Korea could be annexed by North Korea without having the opportunity to exercise its right of self-defense before being attacked by North Korean nuclear missiles while expecting the implementation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella.

The loss of South Korea would not result in any decisive damage to the U.S.'s national interests. Neither the loss of South Vietnam nor the loss of Afghanistan inflicted decisive harm on the United States. However, countless South Vietnamese and Afghans were killed as a result of the U.S.'s last-minute decision not to keep its promise. If the United States gives up South Korea, a reign of terror will be committed for several years by North Korea’s communist regime, and countless South Koreans will lose their lives and freedom.

This author would like to repeat the same question raised before to U.S. officials and scholars. If you were South Korean officials, scholars, and citizens, would you not take any action while only trusting the U.S. nuclear umbrella promise?

Forward Deployment of U.S. Nuclear Forces

If the United States really intends to protect South Korea at any cost, it must forward-deploy its nuclear weapons closer to the Korean Peninsula as the North Korean nuclear threat grows more severe, just as the United States did during the Cold War. The forward deployment of today will be riskier than that of the Cold War era. China and Russia will oppose it vehemently, to the point of threatening to engage in nuclear war. If the United States deploys nuclear weapons in South Korea, North Korea will almost certainly attack and destroy it with nuclear missiles or initiate an all-out war to reunify the whole of Korea. However, this does not mean that the United States should abandon this option. There appear to be ways to avoid provoking China, Russia, and North Korea’s preventive attacks.

The United States can gradually increase the degree of the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in accordance with North Korea's nuclear threat situation. Most importantly, it should consider a forward deployment by sea first. The gradual increase in the level of forward deployment and sea deployment, for example, using submarines, can prevent the expected vehement opposition from China and Russia. North Korea's eastern side is bordered by the sea, which is deep enough for effective submarine operations. Since Pyongyang is only about 150 kilometers from the sea, North Korea has no choice but to take the threat of U.S. nuclear submarines seriously.

As a first step, the United States needs to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear forces near the Korean Peninsula via submarines. At least one U.S. SSBN should always be deployed in the sea between the Korean Peninsula and Japan. The United States and South Korea share the key information about the deployment and release the relevant amount of information about the presence of a U.S. nuclear submarine near North Korea for deterrence purposes. This could be called "presence sharing."

The second step is to share the low-yield nuclear weapon (W76-2) on the U.S. SSBN between the United States and South Korea. Since the United States has the final decision-making authority on the use of nuclear weapons, it cannot be said to be shared in the strict sense. However, the two allies can have close consultations regarding the use of low-yield nuclear missiles, thereby partially enabling South Korea to exercise its right of self-defense. If the situation deteriorates, the sharing is expanded to a few regular SLBMs. In this way, the U.S. could also share its responsibility for a nuclear retaliation against North Korea because it is supposed to decide the use of nuclear weapons at the request of South Korea rather than by its own unilateral decision. In addition, if North Korea learns that South Korea can request a nuclear attack on North Korea to the United States in the name of self-defense and the United States will probably accept the request, it is more likely to refrain from a nuclear attack on South Korea.

The third step is to share one or two U.S. SSBNs. The United States and South Korea together operate one or two U.S. SSBNs in the Indo-Pacific area. If it is difficult to assign one SSBN for the task of deterring North Korea, the United States can increase the number of SSBNs by removing one or two ICBMs or bombers from its nuclear Triad in order not to violate its agreement with Russia. The US should declare that the primary mission of the SSBNs deployed in the seas surrounding the Korean Peninsula is to provide South Korea with the promised nuclear umbrella and to conduct joint exercises with the South Korean navy. South Korea must contribute to the operating costs of the SSBN.

As a fourth step, the United States could forward-deploy some of its nuclear forces tasked with retaliatory strike missions against North Korea to Guam. It could deploy intermediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads and/or nuclear bombs. Guam is a U.S. territory, so this option will not cause any serious problems under international law. It will not be easy for China and Russia to oppose it vehemently.

The fifth step is to apply the NATO nuclear sharing agreement to the nuclear forces stationed in Guam. The United States should ask South Korea or other allies to send the F-35A and other aircraft capable of carrying out nuclear retaliation missions against North Korea. The aircraft deployed to Guam will conduct a nuclear mission drill. If China and Russia object, it must be emphasized that Guam is US territory and that they are interfering in U.S. internal or alliance affairs. The United States could also emphasize that all measures will be canceled if only the two countries make North Korea give up its nuclear weapons.

This approach is not without risks. However, the expected risks seem to be much smaller than other options, such as allowing South Korea’s nuclear armament. Most of all, in the current situation, in which North Korea is attempting to attack and annex South Korea using nuclear weapons, any risks must be accepted as calculated ones.

Conclusion

Until now, the United States has taken a leading role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. When North Korea was in the course of developing nuclear weapons, the United States led negotiations to block the country's development of nuclear weapons. It signed the "Agreement Framework" with North Korea in 1994. After the collapse of the agreement, the United States led the six-party talks. However, the United States has failed to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. In 2018?2019, the United States had intensive negotiations for the denuclearization of North Korea. However, it failed, either. The U.S.' most recent denuclearization talks with North Korea ended up giving North Korea the time it needed to strengthen its nuclear forces to a strategic level capable of attacking the U.S. mainland.

One of the reasons for the U.S.' total failure could be the country's reluctance to take a risky option in dealing with North Korea. The United States always used mild and non-risky measures and delayed the resolution of the problem. North Korea could not have developed nuclear weapons if the United States had carried out a surgical strike on its Yongbyon nuclear reactor in 1994. Despite the fact that U.S. officials expended significant effort in North Korea, they were unable to persuade North Korean leaders to abandon their nuclear ambitions. All the U.S. presidents did not want to provoke any serious military conflict with North Korea during their respective terms. North Korea was well aware of this weakness of the United States and either delayed negotiations as much as possible or bought time with deceptive agreements. Eventually, North Korea developed nuclear forces capable of attacking the U.S. mainland.

A more fundamental reason for the U.S.'s failure is that it did not allow active South Korean involvement in its denuclearization negotiations with North Korea. In fact, South Korea is the largest shareholder and stakeholder in this issue because North Korea's goal with its nuclear weapons is to annex South Korea. It is also true that the South Korean progressive government gave up its role as a shareholder and stakeholder regarding this issue. South Koreans, as people of the same ethnicity as North Koreans, know North Korea well and cannot be easily fooled by it. If South Korea had led the negotiations with North Korea, it would have pursued a definitive solution instead of delaying the problem. As South Korea was excluded, North Korea could easily deceive the United States.

The United States now faces a situation in which North Korea seeks the communization of South Korea in the name of "the second mission." Even now, the United States needs to give a bigger role to South Korea in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat. It should respect South Korea's opinions as much as possible. It should share all the information, analyses, and measures regarding the North Korean nuclear threat with South Korea and try to solve the problem together with that country. If negotiations with North Korea resume, South Korea must be present as a responsible party. If North Korea opposes the participation of South Korea, the United States should reject the negotiation. The United States and South Korea should be a seamless team in dealing with the North Korean nuclear threat.

U.S. officials and academics should not be alarmed by South Korea's discussion of its own nuclear armament. They would do the same if they were South Korean officials or academics in this situation. They should try to understand South Korea's concerns and try to reduce the concern with practical measures that could assure the implementation of their nuclear umbrella for South Korea. They should encourage their South Korean counterparts to propose the best way to effectively deter North Korea's nuclear threat instead of criticizing South Korea for its low trust in their nuclear umbrella. If they think that they cannot guarantee the implementation of the nuclear umbrella, they should let their South Korean counterparts know it in order to allow the South Koreans to take the necessary measures to exercise their right of self-defense before it is too late. If the United States does not take any necessary countermeasures against the aggravated North Korean nuclear threat, North Korea could be emboldened to attack South Korea.

As unpleasant as it may sound to U.S. officials and academics, the United States unilaterally abandoned its commitments to the Vietnamese and Afghans. Who can guarantee that the same will not happen to South Korea? Most U.S. officials tell their South Korean counterparts to trust their nuclear umbrella promise, but in reality, there is nothing they can do if the U.S. president decides not to keep his country’s nuclear umbrella promise to South Korea.