Hwee-rhak, Park
Chair, Nuclear Deterrence and Defense Committee, Hansun Foundation
hrpark5502@daum.net
At the plenary session of the Workers’ Party Congress on December 30, 2023, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un called South Korea his country’s “main enemy,” defined South and North Korea's relationship as “belligerent,” and demanded his military prepare for “a great event to suppress the whole territory of South Korea by mobilizing all physical means and forces, including nuclear forces." In early 2024, he re-emphasized “completely occupying, suppressing, and reclaiming [South Korea] and incorporating it into the territory of our Republic [North Korea].” Actually, in September 2022, North Korea designated the mission of its nuclear forces as “영토완정 [the complete territorial establishment/conclusion/ rectification],” which means its full control of the whole Korean Peninsula, when it revised its law on nuclear forces.”
However, most South Koreans perceive these aggressive statements as either bluster or messages aimed at the domestic audience. Thus, despite North Korea's aggressive nuclear threat to attack and annex South Korea, South Koreans have not strengthened their discussions on how to defend themselves from the North Korean nuclear threat these days. In particular, the North Korean nuclear threat was not an issue during South Korea’s parliamentary election in April 2024. South Koreans should reflect on their history and remember that their ancestors’ or their old generation’s complacency and reluctance to prepare for war allowed Japan’s invasion in 1592, Chinese invasions in 1627 and 1636, and North Korea’s surprise attack in 1950.
Formidable North Korean nuclear forces
It is almost impossible to exactly know the number of nuclear weapons that North Korea possess. Most institutes or researchers can only estimate the range of North Korea’s nuclear weapons from the possible amount of Plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU) that North Korea could have processed so far. Most of them has used 20?60 range, but a joint report made by RAND in the U.S. and the Asan Policy Institute in South Korea estimated differently. The two institutes assessed that North Korea had 67?116 nuclear weapons as of 2020, with the capacity to produce 12?18 nuclear weapons per year.[1] In the 2023 report, they estimated the number as 150. The report even cautioned that this number could be conservative, considering Kim Jong-un’s direction to “exponentially increase” nuclear weapon production in 2023.[2]
As a means of delivering these nuclear weapons, North Korea has developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), such as Hwasong-15, 17, and 18, to attack the U.S. mainland. A U.S. expert estimated that North Korea’s ICBMs, such as the 12 launchers of its Hwasong-17 shown in the military parade on February 8, 2023, “can overwhelm existing U.S. homeland missile defenses and ensure U.S. vulnerability to missile attacks.”[3] North Korea also has a few submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), such as Puguksong-3, -4, and -5 and has a 3,000-ton submarine, which could technically deliver these SLBMs to the U.S. mainland on one-way mission.[4]
In other words, North Korea has the capability to attack cities on the U.S. mainland with nuclear weapons and this capability will make the United States hesitate to implement its nuclear umbrella promise to South Korea. If North Korea assess that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is not credible, it can initiate another reunification war against South Korea.
North Korea's Goal of its Nuclear Armament
There has been continuous, on-going debate on the real goal of North Korea’s nuclear armament. Most South Koreans believed that North Korea had developed its nuclear weapons as an extension of the Korean War to annex South Korea into its territory. However, South Korean progressives argued that North Korea shifted its focus to ensuring the safety or survival of its regime, given its weak economy and instability. However, North Korea’s emphasis on “the complete territorial establishment/conclusion/rectification” and its recent aggressive words against South Korea challenge the progressive’s argument.
In particular, two U.S. scholars, including Siegfried Hecker, who visited North Korea several times and saw the North Korean nuclear facilities, assessed that “the situation on the Korean Peninsula is more dangerous than it has been at any time since early June 1950... like his grandfather in 1950, Kim Jong Un has made a strategic decision to go to war.”[5] Robert Gallucci, who actively participated in the denuclearization negotiations in the 1990s warned that “a nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.”[6]
North Korea has intentionally revealed its activities to attack South Korea with its nuclear weapons since 2023. In March 2023, it detonated a mock nuclear missile warhead in its airspace. In April, it tested its underwater nuclear attack drone to cause a tsunami to hit South Korean ports. In August, it disclosed the image that Kim pointed to Seoul as a target on a blurred-out map of the Korean peninsula. North Korea’s rhetoric and recent actions demonstrate that the eventual goal of its nuclear armament was to attack and annex South Korea, and it has been searching for the perfect opportunity to initiate the attack.
A Possible Attack Scenario: Limited attack on Seoul
North Korea could initiate a limited surprise attack on Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, which is only 40 kilometers from the border. Due to several well-developed roads from the north to Seoul, North Korean ground forces, facilitated and led by special forces, could reach Seoul in a few days. South Korean forces will have difficulty blocking their advances because of the flat terrain, limited space and time, and dense apartment buildings.
Actually, North Korea demanded and created two favorable avenues of approach towards Seoul through the inter-Korean military agreement signed on September 19, 2018, when South Korean President Moon Jae-in visited Pyongyang, the North Korean capital city, in the name of negotiations for the denuclearization of North Korea. According to the agreement, the South Korean military demined and built a 12-meter-wide road in the DMZ at Cheorwon area (northeast flank to defend Seoul) in the name of preparation for the excavation of Korean War remains. The excavation never happened, but the road is still in place. South Korea also provided North Korea with information about the Han River estuary (its western flank to defend Seoul) in the name of civilians’ use of the area by the two Koreas. The civilian use was not realized, even though South Korea provided specific information (about the speed of war, the rocks in the river bed, etc.),[7] which could be useful for the river-crossing operations for the North Korean forces. If North Korea uses these two avenues of approach, it could envelop Seoul quickly.
As North Korean forces move into Seoul, North Korean leaders suggest stopping its military operations and starting a negotiation in order to peacefully solve the situation. They would threaten to use nuclear weapons if the two countries launched any major military operation. On the other hand, they would strengthen their occupation of Seoul and control and indoctrinate the South Korean people. At some point, they would announce that the majority of people in Seoul wanted to be part of North Korea and would conduct a referendum to identify the people’s minds. Then, they release the referendum results that overwhelmingly support Seoul’s annexation of North Korea. They might apply the same process to other cities in South Korea and gradually expand their annexation areas.
Implications
Despite its international recognition as a permanently neutral country, Switzerland not only maintains a sizable army but also possesses the world's most advanced and extensive nuclear civil defense facilities. The key to national defense is preparation for the worst-case scenario. For individuals, it is similar to purchasing an insurance policy. From an objective perspective, there is no country that is under as serious a security threat as South Korea at this point.
Fortunately, the current South Korean government and military are taking the North Korean nuclear threat seriously and are doing their best to take necessary measures, such as strengthening their alliance with the United States and expanding the capabilities of their defense mechanism, the “three-axis system.” In particular, the United States and South Korea established the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to constantly consult on the situation surrounding the North Korean nuclear threat and announced plans to deploy the US nuclear submarine more frequently around the Korean Peninsula in the “Washington Declaration” in April 2023. However, if South Korean people are complacent and ignore the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat, government-level efforts alone cannot ensure deterrence and defense against North Korea.
When South Koreans worry about security, they often mention the complacent attitude and policies that the leaders of the Joseon Dynasty (1392?1910) had before the outbreak of the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1592 and the Chinese invasion in 1627 and 1636. They even criticized their leaders in the 1950s because they did not prevent the Korean War. However, the current South Korean generations could be blamed by future generations for not doing their best to prevent North Korea’s nuclear attack on South Korea because of the current generation’s similar level of complacency to that of their ancestors.
Only when the people change will the history of a certain country change. South Koreans should keep in mind the old adage that “if you wish for peace, prepare for war.” They should actively support the current Yoon Administration’s policy of “peace through strength” instead of being deceived by the propaganda of complacency. In particular, they should select their representatives after examining each individual representative’s views on national security in order to make their representatives do their best to ensure their safety from the North Korean nuclear threat.
[1] Bruce Bennett, Kang Choi, Myong-Hyun Go, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Jiyoung Park, Bruce Klingner, and Du-Hyeogn Cha, “Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons,” ASAN-RAND joint report, Rand, 2021, 37, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html
[2] Bruce W. Bennett, Kang Choi, Cortez A. Cooper Iii, Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., Myong-Hyun Go, Gregory S. Jones, Du-Hyeogn Cha, Uk Yang, “Options for Strengthening ROK Nuclear Assurance,” Research Report, Rand/Asan, 2023, 17.
[3] Vann H. Van Diepen, “The Sleeper Has Awakened: Six Key Takeaways from the Rollout of North Korea’s ‘Tactical Nuclear Attack Submarine,’” Informed analysis of events in and around North Korea, 38 North, September 11, 2023, https://www.38north.org/2023/09/the-sleeper-has-awakened-six-key-takeaways-from-the-roll-out-of-north-koreas-tactical-nuclear-attack-submarine/
[4] Elizabeth Shim “North Korea’s 3,000-ton submarine being closely watched, Seoul says,” UPI, April 26, 2021, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2021/04/26/North-Korea-3000-ton-submarine-under-monitor/9671619441047/
[5] Robert L. Carlin and Siegfried S. Hecker, “Is Kim Jong Un Preparing for War?” Informed analysis of events in and around North Korea, 38 North (11 January 2024), https://www.38north.org/2024/01/is-kim-jong-un-preparing-for-war/
[6] Robert Gallucci, “Is Diplomacy Between the US and North Korea Possible in 2024?” Blog, National Interest, January 11, 2024, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/diplomacy-between-us-and-north-korea-possible-2024-208528.
[7] Ji-won Noh, “S. Korea shares nautical charts of Han River estuary with N. Korea,” Hangyoreh, January 31, 2019. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/880735.html