Kim Jong-un’s Watchtower Diplomacy 

Kang, Jun-young

 Professor, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

1. Raising the Issue

 There is no need to emphasize anew Korea’s geopolitical difficulties. Not only is Korea caught between the United States, the world’s strongest power, and China, which challenges it, but also faces Japan, the world’s third-largest economic power. Above all, Korea faces a very belligerent North Korea that poses a continuous nuclear threat.

 In particular, while the strategic competition between the United States and China continues without the slightest concession, the Russia?Ukraine war shows no prospect of resolution, and the Middle East remains unstable with clashes between Israel and Iran. Armed conflicts between India and Pakistan, as well as between Thailand and Cambodia, add to the turmoil, as local wars break out around the globe. With the tariff rampage of the second Trump administration?aptly described as “tariff imperialism”?the traditional triangular cooperation among Korea, the United States, and Japan has also been affected. On June 3, the newly launched Lee Jae-myung government, overcoming extreme political turmoil, declared “practical diplomacy based on national interests with the Korea?U.S. alliance as the foundation.” Despite concerns, it announced the strengthening of relations through a Korea?Japan summit, and achieved, at least superficially, more positive outcomes than expected in the Korea?U.S. summit.

 On that very day, after President Lee returned from the Korea?Japan and Korea?U.S. summits, China officially announced Chairman Kim Jong-un’s attendance at the Victory Day celebrations, and North Korea confirmed this through the Korean Central News Agency. By showing North Korea standing with China, Pyongyang needed to win back Xi Jinping’s estranged heart, while Beijing’s embrace of North Korea reflected its urgent perception of the need to restore traditional influence. Especially as President Trump expressed his wish to hold a U.S.?North Korea summit within the year, Kim’s attendance at the Victory Day event carries sufficient weight to amplify uncertainty in the security environment surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Above all, amid concerns that Korea?U.S.?Japan cooperation may falter under Trump’s tariff wars, the move naturally connects to the emergence of a China?North Korea?Russia solidarity structure.

 Now, the diplomatic calculus of the Lee government has become more complicated. Although sending conciliatory gestures to North Korea, Pyongyang has completely ignored them. In such a situation, if the leaders of North Korea, China, and Russia gather in Beijing and form a full-fledged trilateral coalition, the sense of isolation and helplessness for Korea in external affairs may intensify. In this regard, accurately understanding the intentions of North Korea and China and the emerging North Korea?China?Russia structure, and deciding how to unfold North Korea policy and overall foreign policy, has become a central task.

2. Kim Jong-un Standing on the Tiananmen Watchtower

 Kim Jong-un’s attendance at China’s Victory Day ceremony marks his first debut on a multilateral diplomatic stage. North Korea’s Kim Il-sung attended China’s fifth anniversary founding ceremony and military parade in October 1954, right after the Korean War, and later multilateral diplomatic events in the Soviet Union (1959, 1961), Indonesia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1980). However, National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong-il never appeared on a multilateral stage. Thus, Kim Jong-un’s attendance at China’s military parade is the first time in 45 years that a North Korean supreme leader has appeared in such a venue. Although Kim, who had so far engaged only in bilateral meetings, chose to participate in a multilateral setting primarily to show goodwill toward China, several intentions are also evident.

 First, with the Russia?Ukraine war moving toward an end, North Korea urgently needs risk management concerning its future position. By attending the Victory Day event that China actively uses as its diplomatic stage, Kim can dispel rumors of strained relations between North Korea and China in one stroke. From North Korea’s perspective, suffering severe economic hardship, restoring cooperation with China is essential because Chinese economic assistance is desperately needed.

 Second, if dialogue with the United States is to be considered, securing negotiating leverage makes coordination with China indispensable, just as during the U.S.?North Korea talks in Trump’s first term. In fact, Kim met Xi Jinping ahead of the 2018 inter-Korean and U.S.?North Korea summits, and again visited China before the 2019 Hanoi summit to seek policy coordination. As is well known, North Korea pursues “sanction evasion” and “justification of nuclear armament” through support from China and Russia. Without close relations with China, its negotiating leverage with the United States diminishes, making the restoration of ties urgent.

 Third, after declaring inter-Korean relations as “hostile relations between two warring states” in December 2023, North Korea has sought to deepen physical and psychological separation from the South while defining the current era as one of a “new Cold War and multipolarity.” It aims to establish itself as a de facto nuclear power with independent status. Reflecting this, Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the Workers’ Party, stated on the 19th that Kim Jong-un’s foreign policy vision seeks “preemptive diplomatic responses to adversarial countries” and to manipulate shifting regional and international geopolitics to North Korea’s advantage. This indicates a shift to a more assertive and offensive diplomatic stance.

 Finally, Kim’s first multilateral debut attended by leaders from 26 nations may also serve as a platform for North Korea, despite being an illegal nuclear state, to be tacitly recognized as a nuclear-armed country. Whether this calculation works is uncertain. However, Kim standing on the Tiananmen watchtower alongside other leaders can help shed his image as an isolated and reclusive leader, while allowing North Korea to be recognized within the China-led “anti-American coalition.”

 Ultimately, Kim’s decision to visit China after six and a half years stems from the judgment that current international conditions present an opportunity to pursue favorable diplomacy. North Korea appears to be crafting a new equation that encompasses the impact of Kim’s visit to China, his relations with Putin after the end of the war, and strategies toward the U.S. and South Korea. Already, through the restoration of a military alliance with Russia, North Korea has deployed troops to the Russian battlefield to gain combat experience and pursued military?scientific cooperation, enhancing conventional forces with missiles, reconnaissance satellites, and even two 5,000-ton destroyers recently launched. Restoring China as a backer could provide a “two-birds-with-one-stone” effect.

3. China’s Position and Intentions

 It is unclear who extended the invitation first, but China’s needs are clear. Globally, fatigue is growing over Trump’s unilateral “tariff rampage” outside traditional norms. For China, locked in strategic competition with the U.S., this offers another opportunity. Watching Trump’s erratic moves, China has postponed tariff negotiations, showcasing instead a relatively stable “Chinese capacity.”

 On this basis of confidence, China is boldly building an anti-U.S. coalition. Although China has little direct link to World War II victory, it defines Japan’s defeat as the “Victory of the War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War” and actively uses this to construct diplomacy and an anti-U.S. solidarity. With concerns that Korea?U.S.?Japan cooperation is shaken by Trump’s tariff wars, China seeks to visualize a China?North Korea?Russia alignment. Inviting Putin and Kim to the Victory Day event fits this pattern.

 China listed President Putin first and Chairman Kim second among the attending heads of state. By standing on the Tiananmen watchtower with Putin and Kim, President Xi Jinping aims to send a clear message of resistance to the U.S.- and Western-led world order. With North Korea having restored its alliance with Russia, estrangement in North Korea?China ties negatively affects China’s influence over the Korean Peninsula. If a U.S.?North Korea summit proceeds, China fears being left out. North Korea, as a “strategic buffer,” retains value as a bargaining card against Washington, so Beijing also needs to restore relations.

 Above all, China wants to demonstrate that Xi Jinping can wield more influence over North Korea and Russia than President Trump. Kim’s visit also serves as coordination with China and Russia ahead of a possible U.S.?North Korea summit at the APEC meeting. Xi aims to show Trump who truly holds the cards and to signal China’s geopolitical advantage. Although China’s influence over Kim and Putin is limited, it is still greater than Trump’s.

 Furthermore, China’s effort to stage North Korea?Russia?China solidarity also reflects its wariness of Trump’s favorable stance toward negotiating with Kim and Putin. Xi does not want to see Washington, Pyongyang, and Moscow approaching each other while bypassing Beijing, so he seeks to pull North Korea closer. At the same time, China strongly criticizes Korea?U.S.?Japan cooperation as an “Asian NATO,” yet building a practical North Korea?Russia?China trilateral coalition is burdensome. Likely, Beijing will focus on strengthening bilateral ties and practical cooperation while maintaining a dominant position. Even if a trilateral coalition forms, divergent goals regarding the U.S. limit joint actions. Moreover, despite China’s claim that the event “protects the international order,” the spectacle may symbolize division in the global community, burdening Beijing.

4. What Korea Needs ? In Place of a Conclusion

 The first diplomatic tests of the Lee Jae-myung administration?summits with Japan and the U.S.?are now over. Grounded in the Korea?U.S. alliance, practical diplomacy focused on national interest was successfully completed. Though previous governments also emphasized practical diplomacy, Lee’s version stresses proactive engagement at regional and global levels, demonstrating diplomatic flexibility and pragmatism. He also expressed willingness to engage flexibly with China and Russia, while hoping for stable relations with North Korea, having already taken conciliatory steps such as restoring the September 19 military agreement and dismantling loudspeakers along the border, regardless of Pyongyang’s response.

 Above all, China’s sudden pivot to Kim Jong-un’s visit after failing to invite President Lee to the Victory Day event is telling. In 2015, President Park Geun-hye attended the 70th anniversary celebrations despite concerns, but the following year received no help from China in deterring North Korea’s fourth nuclear test and ICBM launches. Today, the sight of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing together on the Tiananmen watchtower would have highlighted the Lee government’s “pro-China” image, creating diplomatic burdens with allies and partners. Hence, President Lee declined to attend, reflecting Korea’s predicament of being unable to gamble on uncertain outcomes.

 Korea, caught between China?which cannot ignore Korea’s role at the forefront of U.S.?Japan?Korea cooperation against it?and the U.S., which expects allied solidarity, has long sought to avoid entanglement in U.S.?China strategic rivalry. Choosing sides does not solve the problem. When President Lee stated that the past logic of  “security with the U.S., economy with China” (Anmi Gyeongjung) was no longer valid, China reacted strongly. The Global Times criticized Korea’s stance as surrendering national interests to U.S. dependence and warned against forgetting past damage to bilateral relations over THAAD.

 As is well known, Korea faces complex pressures from both the U.S. and China, each demanding geopolitical and geoeconomic loyalty. Although Korea dispatched a special envoy to Beijing, Wang Yi urged Korea to adopt a “parallel development of relations with major powers,” essentially requesting equidistant diplomacy between the U.S. and China. However, gaps in security priorities remain: for Seoul, deterring North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats is the priority; for Washington, countering China; and for Beijing, breaking free from U.S.?Japan?Korea pressure. Narrowing this gap will determine the success of “practical diplomacy based on national interest.”

 This derives from Korea’s inevitable geopolitical constraints. Strengthening deterrence against North Korea through the Korea?U.S. alliance?preventing both provocation and war?is essential. To say that “security with the U.S., economy with China” is no longer valid does not mean rejecting China. Just as Korea cannot rely solely on the U.S. for security, it cannot depend only on China for the economy. This is a pragmatic expression, as well as a declaration of intent to break from the binary logic that pro-U.S. means anti-China, and pro-China means anti-U.S.

 Therefore, Korea must make clear that its hedging between the U.S. and China is not passive neutrality or avoidance, but a strategic choice driven by national necessity. The key is whether Korea can overcome North Korea’s threat with U.S. security cooperation, while persuading China that Korea’s alliance with Washington does not equate to hostility toward Beijing. Only by continuously conveying this can Korea expand its diplomatic space.

Note: The views expressed herein may differ from those of the Hansun Foundation.

(※ It's a translation based on machine translation)