The “Perilous Path” of the Lee Jae-myung Administration

Sohn Yong-woo

Policy Committee Member,

Hansun Foundation

                                            1. A Crisis of Constitutional Order

2. An Anti-Constitutional Course in the Rule of Law

3. An Anti-Constitutional Turn in North Korea Policy

 4. Restoring a Constitution-Based National Strategy

1. A Crisis of Constitutional Order

The governing philosophy of President Lee Jae-myung’s administration is now taking clearer shape. The centrist and pragmatic line he had emphasized during the presidential campaign has rapidly faded since taking office, replaced by the progressive-leftist ideology that has long underpinned the Democratic Party. From an ideological perspective, this could be viewed as a normal democratic choice Korean voters opted for a camp that values equality, redistribution, and government intervention over the conservative bloc’s emphasis on liberty, growth, and market principles.

However, what followed has raised grave concerns. The administration’s governing style is revealing an increasingly authoritarian and totalitarian tendency rarely seen even in the Democratic Party’s own history. The speed and intensity with which power is being exercised often in a high-handed and unilateral manner have gone beyond what was anticipated. This rapid shift threatens to undermine Korea’s constitutional order and the very foundation of liberal democracy.

2. An Anti-Constitutional Course in the Rule of Law

The ruling camp, which should be the guardian of constitutional governance, is now dismantling the safeguards of the rule of law. If the Yoon Suk-yeol government’s emergency rule crisis represented an act of self-harm to democracy, the current administration’s unilateralism constitutes a different but equally serious threat. The Democratic Party is reconstructing laws and institutions according to political necessity, undermining both the separation of powers and procedural legitimacy the core of liberal democracy.

By labeling the main opposition party as a “rebellious force,” party leaders are eroding the democratic norms of tolerance and mutual respect. Party chairman Jung Chung-rae’s description of the People Power Party as a “state-subversion group” exemplifies a dangerous rhetoric that excludes political opponents from the democratic community. Political competition is being transformed from a contest of policy visions into a zero-sum struggle of annihilation.

The Democratic Party’s overwhelming parliamentary majority is being leveraged to institutionalize long-term, authoritarian rule through legal manipulation. The proposed “Special Court for Rebellion” epitomizes this trajectory an unprecedented legislative attempt to directly appoint judges for specific cases, violating judicial independence and the principle of separation of powers. Additional measures, such as pressuring the Chief Justice to resign, expanding the number of Supreme Court justices, and introducing performance evaluations and disciplinary controls over judges, all point to a single direction: subordinating the judiciary to legislative dominance.

While the administration insists these moves are constitutional, the legal community and public opinion largely view them as blatant violations. Such acts threaten to politicize the judiciary, including the Constitutional Court itself. Under the guise of “popular sovereignty,” the government has turned majority rule into an absolute principle pushing through legislation without restraint. Democracy, however, rests not only on majority rule but also on the protection of minority rights, separation of powers, and the rule of law. Without these, legality becomes a mere facade concealing the erosion of constitutional democracy.

3. An Anti-Constitutional Turn in North Korea Policy

The Lee administration’s North Korea policy builds upon, yet radicalizes, the “Sunshine Policy” of the Kim Dae-jung era, which prioritized engagement over confrontation. That earlier approach rooted in the “immanent” understanding of North Korea’s logic sought change through dialogue and economic aid but failed to uphold reciprocity. It neglected human rights abuses, failed to deter military provocations, and indirectly supported Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions.

Lee Jae-myung’s North Korea policy follows the same ideological lineage but with even greater intensity and ambition. Its scope extends beyond inter-Korean reconciliation toward reshaping the strategic order of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. This “national cooperation” framework risks undermining South Korea’s constitutional order and alliance system, especially the U.S.-ROK alliance, while deepening security instability.

Leading this approach are prominent “self-reliance faction” figures such as Unification Minister Chung Dong-young and National Intelligence Service Director Lee Jong-seok. They prioritize ethnic unity and autonomy over alliance commitments, viewing the North Korea issue as an internal national matter rather than a security concern. Meanwhile, figures such as National Security Advisor Wi Sung-lac and Foreign Minister Cho Hyun, who represent the “pro-alliance” camp, play only a secondary, legitimizing role. This division of labor was intentionally designed from the start, not an organic power struggle.

President Lee’s policy rests on three principles respecting the North Korean regime, renouncing absorption unification, and ceasing all hostile acts and on his “END Initiative,” which stands for Exchange, Normalization, and Denuclearization. While framed as a peace roadmap, it effectively accepts North Korea’s “two-state” doctrine by implying full diplomatic normalization. Minister Chung even stated explicitly that “the South and North are, in effect, two states,” directly contradicting the 1991 Inter-Korean Basic Agreement and Article 3 of South Korea’s Constitution, which defines the national territory as encompassing the entire Korean Peninsula.

Such a stance not only institutionalizes division but also risks eroding constitutional legitimacy. Moreover, recognizing North Korea’s “strategic state” status, as Chung suggested in Berlin, tacitly legitimizes Pyongyang’s de facto nuclear-weapon state identity. This shift represents an implicit acceptance of North Korea’s nuclear reality an abandonment of both South Korea’s constitutional principles and the global nonproliferation regime (NPT).

Despite its rhetoric of peace and coexistence, the Lee administration’s North Korea policy effectively rationalizes Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal through an “internalist” lens. It thus undermines the foundations of South Korea’s liberal-democratic identity and international security commitments. Ultimately, it risks weakening the U.S.-ROK alliance, eroding trust within the liberal democratic bloc, and enabling North Korea’s de facto nuclear status akin to India or Pakistan. This is a perilous and unconstitutional shift that threatens the Republic’s sovereignty and security.

4. Restoring a Constitution-Based National Strategy

The Lee administration is shaking the foundations of constitutional governance on both pillars of statehood rule of law and national security. In the legal sphere, it politicizes state institutions and erodes judicial independence. In the security sphere, it rationalizes the North’s regime and nuclear weapons under the rhetoric of “peace.” When these two trends converge, democracy loses its substance, retaining only its formal shell.

Recent measures halting loudspeaker broadcasts, delaying military drills, restoring the September 19 military accord, shelving the North Korean Human Rights Foundation, and withholding human rights reports have all been justified as steps toward de-escalation. In reality, they align with Pyongyang’s strategic objectives. Proposals to dismantle the Ministry of Unification further hint at institutionalizing the “two-state” framework. This reflects a coherent ideological drive to replace South Korea’s constitutional order with an ethnic-nationalist paradigm.

As a result, deterrence against the North has weakened, trust within the U.S.-ROK alliance has eroded, and the global nonproliferation regime has been undermined creating a triple-layered security risk. This violates the state’s constitutional duty to defend liberal democracy and safeguard its citizens’ lives.

The ROK-U.S. alliance now stands at a crossroads. As Seoul deepens ties with China and Russia while prioritizing dialogue with Pyongyang, strategic ambiguity grows and trust within the liberal camp diminishes. With a second Trump administration likely to pursue more transactional policies tariff hikes, defense cost increases, and investment pressure South Korea’s left-wing populism may find renewed anti-American traction. Should the Lee government exploit this politically, reframing the alliance through the rhetoric of “self-reliance” and “nationalism,” the alliance could face not just tension but strategic rupture.

What Korea needs now is not illusory peace but a restoration of constitutional rule and a peace strategy grounded in deterrence and reality. True peace on the Korean Peninsula can be sustained only through self-strengthening, alliance trust, rule of law, and public safety not through appeasement or ideological idealism.

The Republic of Korea cannot accept nuclear coexistence or the “two-state” paradigm without abandoning its constitutional identity. The moment a nation dismantles its own constitutional defenses and chooses submissive coexistence with a nuclear-armed adversary, it ceases to be a liberal democracy. Overcoming today’s crisis thus requires the restoration of a national strategy rooted in liberal democracy and republican principles.

This crisis, however, is not solely the result of Lee Jae-myung’s unilateralism; it is also the consequence of the former ruling People Power Party’s misjudgments and inaction. The question now is whether the conservatives possess the insight, strategy, and conviction to rebalance the political order. Without them, the banner of liberty and the rule of law will have no ground left to stand upon.

This article may differ from the views of the Hansun Foundation.

(※ It's a translation based on machine translation)