Is the Reduction of U.S. Forces in Germany None of Our Concern?

Yang Don-sun

Representative, Germany Research Forum,

Hansun Foundation

1. Impact of a Potential Reduction in U.S. Forces in Germany

2. Trends in Germany’s Rearmament

3. Korea’s Security Response Posture

On April 27, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz commented on the war between the United States and Iran, stating that, “The entire United States is being humiliated” and “There is no strategy in the US ceasfire negotiations.” These comments provoked retaliation from U.S. President Donald Trump. President Trump responded by announcing that he plans to reduce U.S. tropps stationed in Germany by 5,000 and raise tariffs on European automobiles from 15% to 25%. The tariff hike, however, was postponed until July. In response, Chancellor Merz attempted to defuse tensions, saying that , “The United States is our foremost ally and our most important partner,” and that “We will not give up on any effort to improve transatlantic relations.”

Recently, President Trump requested that Germany and other major countries dispatch warships to the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has been blockading, but most countries declined. President Trump also mentioned the possibility of reducing U.S. forces stationed in Italy and Spain, both of which had rejected the U.S. request. President Trump’s recent retaliatory moves regarding security and trade are putting U.S. allies on edge.

Against this backdrop, this article examines the potential impact of a reduction in U.S. forces stationed in Germany, Germany’s recent trends in rearmament, and the implications for Korea’s security posture.

1. Impact of a Potential Reduction in U.S. Forces in Germany

At present, approximately 80,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Europe, of which approximately 37,000, or 46% of the total, are stationed in Germany. The proposed reduction of 5,000 troops amounts to roughly 13.5% of U.S. forces in Germany. The headquarters of U.S. European Command, the headquarters of U.S. Africa Command, and three U.S. air bases are located in Rhineland-Palatinate in western Germany. In particular, Buechel Air Base is known to host U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, including B61 nuclear bombs. These bases serve as hubs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) nuclear-sharing system.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has effectively contained the former Soviet Union and Russia through U.S. forces stationed in Europe. This presence has been a symbol of the solidity of the Western alliance. Since the Russia-Ukraine War, the role of these U.S. forces has been assessed as even more important.

Conversely, however, reducing U.S. forces stationed in Germany would have a considerable impact on Germany’s economy and security. First, let us consider the economic impact. Around U.S. military bases, local economic ecosystems have developed thanks to the presence of U.S. troops, including supermarkets, restaurants, beauty salons, and rental-car businesses. It is similar to areas such as Dongducheon in Korea. Accordingly, if U.S. forces leave, local commercial districts would collapse, unemployment would rise, and municipal tax revenues would decline. Ultimately, the remaining residents would have to shoulder the burden through higher taxes.

Next, from a security perspective, this suggests discord between the United States and NATO, and even a fracture in the transatlantic alliance. This could weaken the West’s ability to function of deter Russia and send the wrong signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin. In fact, such a rift had already been foreshadowed. President Trump has demanded that Europe increase millitary spending to defend itself, and plans to reduce U.S. forces in Europe had in fact long been prepared. Europe, too, is accepting this reality and moving toward taking responsibility for its own security.

Nevertheless, there are also assessments that Chancellor Merz’s remarks lacked prudence given that an actual reduction of U.S. forces in Germany could have a considerable impact on both security and the economy.

2. Trends in Germany’s Rearmament

Germany has long neglected its defense capabilities, constrained by the legacy of being a defeated country in World War II. Its tropps has continued to decline from 500,000 before reunification to only 180,000 today. It also has no nuclear weapons. Germany has made significant efforts toward disarmament, including shifting from conscription to an all-volunteer force. As a result, Germany’s military presence has been neglibitle. At the time outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War, Germany’s defense spending was only 1.5% of GDP, and its military power ranked merely 16th in the world. As a consequence, Germany has consistently ranked first or second in the Global Peace Index. It is nothing short of an irony in history that a country that started two world wars has become one of the world’s foremost peace-oriented nations.

The situation changed completely the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022. President Steinmeier acknowledged the failure of Germany’s strategy toward Russia. In April 2022, Chancellor Olaf Scholz of the Social Democratic Party declared a “Zeitenwende,” or historic turning point, and began rearmament. Under the justification of responding to the Russian threat, Germany sought to move beyond the burden of its historical guilt and shift toward the path of rearmament. This gave rise to the assessment that “Putin awakened a sleeping Germany.”

After taking office in early 2025, Chancellor Merz of the Christian Democratic Union moved quickly to put his rearmament plans into concrete terms. His plan is to invest 1 trillion euros, or about 1,700 trillion Korean won, over the next ten years to strengthen military power and revive the economy. First, he amended the constitution to remove the debt-issuance limit, which had been capped at within 1% of GDP, to expand military spending. He is also opening the way for compulsory conscription and the possible restoration of a draft systeme conscription from the current volunteer system. In addition, in order to strengthen responses to cyber warfare, Germany has decided to expand the cyber-intelligence capabilities of its intelligence agencies, including the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV). In April 2026, for the first time since the World War II, Germany established a “Military Strategy” that identifies Russia as its principal enemy.

Germany’s rearmament will, to some extent, serve as a balancing force in deterring Russia. Russia cannot ignore Germany’s power. This is evidenced by the fact that Putin remained relatively restrained during Chancellor Merkel’s tenure, but launched the war in Ukraine during the transition of power only two months after her departure from office. Germany, too, cannot stop Russian aggression on its own. This is why its alliance with the United States and NATO remains necessary.

3. Korea’s Security Response Posture

Korea is not free from the implications of the U.S.-Iran war either. President Trump has been exerting strong pressure on Korea to participate in the “Project Freedom,” a US-led initiative to ensure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Considering Trump’s temperament, it seems unlikely that Korea will be able to simply brush this off. Even apart from this case, Korea is remains exposed to the North Korean nuclear threat while being geoeconomically vulnerable amid neighboring nuclear-armed military powers such as Russia and China, both of which have allied relationships with North Korea.

At the same time, concerns are mounting that both Korea’s politicians and the broader public may have fallen into complacency about security. In particular, President Lee Jae-myung’s security outlook is a matter of concern. During his candidacy, President Lee advocated the so-called “dirty peace theory,” meaning that “even the dirtiest peace is better than a victorious war.” More recently, he has made remarks such as, “Why should we feel anxious that self-defense would be difficult without foreign troops?”, “Excessive reliance on the ROK-U.S. alliance is undesirable,” and “We will swiftly pursue the restoration of wartime operational control.” These remarks have conveyed the nuance that the ROK-U.S. alliance may no longer be necessary.

In sovereign credit assessments by the world’s three major credit-rating agencies, Korea stands at a very high AA level. It ranks higher than Japan and France and stands shoulder to shoulder with the United Kingdom and Belgium. This is largely attributable to Korea’s fiscal soundness and the stationing of U.S. forces in Korea, because Korea is seen as stable in both economic and security terms.

Under these circumstances, if U.S. forces were to withdraw, it would be difficult to rule out the possibility that North Korea would be tempted toward war. China and Russia are not alternatives for Korea either. Such a withdrawal would also create major factors that could inflict significant damage on the national economy as a whole. First, it would lead to the collapse of local economies surrounding U.S. military bases, becoming a burden on the state. At the same time, Korea’s external credibility would rapidly decline, leading to difficulties such as a contraction in domestic financial markets and a reduction in foreign capital investment and trade with Korea. In reality, it is highly unrealistic for Korea to defend its security alone without the ROK-U.S. alliance.

The president is not merely an ordinary politician. Every word the president speaks is directly tied to the national interest. In particular, once we take a wrong turn on the path of national security, there is no turning back. For that reason, the president’s words must carry weight, and the president’s actions must be prudent.

This article may differ from the views of the Hansun Foundation

(※ It's a translation based on machine translation)