North Korea’s Landmine Provocation Exposes Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Complacent National Security Policies

Hwee Rhak Park

Former Professor, 

Graduate School of Politics, Kookmin Universit

<Table of Contents>
1. Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Response to the Landmine Explosions
2. Necessary Measures that the Lee Jae-myung Administration Should Take 
3. Tasks that South Korean People Should Fulfill

On September 21, 2026, three South Korean military personnel were injured when two North Korean landmines exploded while they were conducting a search operation in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to verify reports that North Korea had planted mines on the South Korean side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). As the two Koreas remain technically at war under the 1953 Armistice Agreement, the MDL established by the agreement has effectively served as the de facto boundary between them. North Korea’s emplacement of mines south of the MDL therefore constituted an encroachment on South Korean territory. Nevertheless, the current administration has neither demanded an apology from North Korea for the mine explosions nor, in the author’s view, taken commensurate punitive measures, raising further questions about its approach to national security.

1. Lee Jae-myung Administration’s Response to the Landmine Explosions

1) Delayed Confirmation That the Exploded Mines Were North Korean

The government appears initially to have considered the possibility that the mines involved in the explosions might not have been North Korean. Yet the very fact that the explosions occurred near the MDL made it highly likely that the mines had been planted by North Korea.

In the past, South Korea planted mines near the Southern Limit Line (SLL), not near the MDL, and the terrain in the area was not such that mines could easily have been displaced and carried by floodwaters. More importantly, South Korea’s M14 mines weigh only about 100 grams and are relatively small, making them unlikely to cause injuries of the current severity sustained by the personnel involved. M16 mines, meanwhile, are much more powerful and are bounding fragmentation mines, meaning they would likely have caused substantially greater injuries. The scale of the explosions therefore also pointed to the likelihood that North Korean mines were responsible.

Most significantly, a mine-detection specialist participating in the operation was among those injured. He stated that the explosion had been caused by a North Korean mine and that he had seen a box-shaped North Korean mine at the site.

Despite these circumstances, the South Korean Ministry of National Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Presidential Office maintained for some time that they could not be certain the mines were North Korean, while delaying an on-site investigation on the grounds of the Chuseok holiday.

After independent lawmaker Han Dong-hoon repeatedly raised the issue and disclosed that personnel involved in the operation had identified the mines as North Korean, the Ministry of National Defense stepped up its verification efforts and moved its planned on-site inspection from September 29 to September 27.

After Han further disclosed that the National Forensic Service, following a detailed examination of the protective gear and mine-protective overboots worn by the soldiers at the time, had assessed the explosive as a “North Korean military mine,” the JCS announced preliminary findings on the evening of September 28, stating that the explosion was “presumed to have been caused by a North Korean resin antipersonnel mine.”
In effect, it took seven days to formally confirm what had reportedly been identified immediately after the explosion.

2) Characterizing the Incident as an “Unfortunate Accident”

As it became clear that North Korean mines had caused the explosions, public dissatisfaction with the government’s restrained response grew. On September 30, President Lee Jae-myung visited the hospital where the injured service members were receiving treatment.
In his Armed Forces Day address on October 1, however, the President referred to the explosion as an “unfortunate accident,” prompting public criticism. He made no direct protest against North Korea over the mine incident and instead reiterated that “the surest form of security is to create peace in which there is no need to fight.” 
Minister of Unification Chung Dong-young likewise stated during a National Assembly audit that the incident could not definitively be characterized as a “landmine attack.” In response, the lawmaker Han Dong-hoon put it, “They were not planted to catch water deer, were they?” Many South Koreans consequently became frustrated with what they regarded as the administration’s complacent assessment of the situation and its reluctance to draw a clear distinction between friend and foe.

3) No Response to North Korea’s Blame-Shifting

The government’s approach was subsequently exploited by North Korea. On September 30, Kim Yo-jong, the sister of the North Korean  leader Kim Jong-un, disparaged South Korea while rejecting the South Korean military’s findings that the explosion was ocurred by the North Korean mines. She characterized Seoul’s account as a fabricated performance and used highly insulting language to denounce the South Korean authorities. The South Korean government did not issue any adequate protest or response.
When the South Korean military announced its final conclusion on October 5 that the explosions had been caused by mines planted by North Korea, Kim dismissed the conclusion again as groundless and declared that North Korea would leave “not even the slightest space or room” for engagement or dialogue with South Korea in any form.
She also pointed to the South Korean unification minister’s own remarks, noting that he had acknowledged that it was difficult to conclude that the mines represented an “intentional attack” by North Korea. This fueled South Koreans’ criticism that the current administration had adopted an excessively submissive posture toward Pyongyang.

4) Absence of Commensurate Measures

During a meeting with the opposition leader on September 28, Minister of National Defense Kang Shin-chul stated that, if it were confirmed that North Korean mines had caused the explosions, the government would consider “appropriate and commensurate response measures.” He maintained this position during the National Assembly audit.
However, despite the JCS’s preliminary and final findings confirming that North Korean mines were responsible, no significant commensurate measure followed. Calls to resume loudspeaker broadcasts toward North Korea were dismissed on the grounds that such broadcasts would be ineffective. Instead, the government merely announced that South Korea would remove the mines planted by North Korea.
South Koreans’ dissatisfaction grew over both the prospect of South Korea itself removing mines planted by North Korea and the absence of any substantive retaliatory or commensurate measures against North Korea.

2. Necessary Measures that the Lee Jae-myung Administration Should Take

First, the Lee Jae-myung administration needs to draw a clear distinction between friend and foe. North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950, and the two Koreas remain in a state of armistice rather than peace. North Korea has also built a formidable nuclear arsenal while maintaining the capability to pursue its long-standing objective of reunifying the Korean Peninsula on its terms.
Pyongyang has defined South Korea as a hostile state, its “No. 1 hostile state,” or an “unchanging principal enemy.” North Korea is therefore an adversary of South Korea and, stated more emphatically, its principal enemy.
The Leee administration’s desire to reduce tensions with North Korea is understandable. Good intentions on South Korea’s part, however, do not in themselves guarantee peace. Blurring the distinction between friend and foe in the name of peace may instead encourage an adversary to underestimate South Korea and could ultimately increase the risk of war.

Second, the administration must clearly recognize that appeasement toward North Korea will not by itself bring peace.
The appeasement policies pursued by Britain and France in the 1930s emboldened Hitler and ultimately condoned him to start the Second World War.
Progressive administrations in South Korea have likewise pursued conciliatory policies toward North Korea, notably under the banner of the “Sunshine Policy.” Yet, these policies failed to bring about any positive change in North Korea and instead condoned North Korea’s continued development and expansion of its nuclear arsenal.
A policy cannot be justified by good intentions alone when its consequences prove harmful.

Third, South Korea should take substantive commensurate measures in response to the current provocatio by North Korea, even if doing so temporarily heightens inter-Korean tensions.
Measures could include resuming loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflet distributions into North Korea so that Pyongyang experiences tangible costs for its provocation and is thereby discouraged from repeating similar provocations.
If South Korea refrains from any response on the grounds that punitive action might provoke further North Korean retaliation, Pyongyang may instead conclude that it can carry out a wide range of provocations without consequence.

Fourth, the South Korean military must investigate and report incidents like current mine explosions honestly and on the basis of facts, without allowing political considerations to shape its initial investigation and conclusion.
The military must be truthful, and neither its situational assessments nor its reports should contain distortions.
It would be inappropriate for the military to prejudge political considerations, distort facts accordingly, or delay the release of findings for political reasons. Even where political considerations must ultimately be weighed at the national level, such judgments must be based on an accurate understanding of the facts.

Fifth, the Minister of Unification should reassess whether his understanding of the situation and his public remarks were appropriate and correct them if necessary.
If mines clearly planted by North Korea exploded on South Korean territory, it is problematic to maintain that their intent cannot be determined or to refuse to characterize the incident as a provocation or attack. Such statements have already been taken advantage of by North Korea.
The Lee administration should also reflect on whether continuing conciliatory measures toward North Korea, including support for medical assistance to North Korea, under current circumstances risks inviting contempt rather than cooperation. The President, for his part, should carefully assess whether the unification minister’s perceptions and conduct meet the standards expected to a member of the Cabinet.

Sixth, the President must give the highest priority to the constitutional duty set out in Article 66, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution.
That provision states that the President bears the duty to safeguard “the independence, territorial integrity, and continuity of the State and the Constitution.” The reason why these statements on national security is explicitly stated as the duty of President in the Constitution is because failures in this area can have grave consequences.
It is difficult to regard the President as fully carrying out the above-mentioned constitutional duty if he treated injuries suffered by soldiers in a landmine explosion merely as an accident without issuing any protest or taking any measures to punish North Korea for its provocation.

Seventh, the President should trust the commanders of the armed forces and ensure that the Ministry of National Defense and the military can handle military affairs with professional independence rather than constantly looking to the presidential office for political cues.
The armed forces should be allowed, under the command of the Minister of National Defense, to focus on preparing for war in accordance with law and established regulations. The President should concentrate on deciding whether to approve matters formally submitted for presidential decision. The surest way to protect both the nation and the President is to ensure that the military can devote itself fully to combat readiness.

3. Tasks that South Korean People Should Fulfill

National security cannot be achieved through the efforts of the President and the government alone. In an advanced democracy, public opinion plays an important role. South Korean people therefore also need to engage actively so that government policy is formulated and implemented in what they believe to be the right direction.
First, the South Koreans must assess the North Korean threat soberly and as it is.
North Korea has developed and possesses a substantial nuclear arsenal. The country has also expressed its intention to attack and absorb South Korea, while identifying the South as its principal enemy and heightening its combat readiness.
South Koreans should recognize the seriousness of this threat and demand that the government formulate rational and effective countermeasures to protect them.

Second, the South Korean people should recognize that conciliatory policies toward North Korea do not automatically produce peace and should call on the government to pursue “principled” North Korea policies instead of appeasing ones.
Even though some risk is involved, South Koreans should demand appropriate punitive or deterrent measures in response to wrongful actions by North Korea. By clearly expressing such views, they can influence the direction of government policy.

Third, the South Korean voters should assess political candidates not only on domestic issues such as economy but also on their attitudes toward and knowledge of national security.
The media should actively examine political leaders’ national security views and their level of knowledge and insight on security affairs and provide that information to the public. Politicians whose positions or conduct reveal serious deficiencies on national security issues should be held politically accountable through democratic tools such as elections.

Fourth, the South Korean people should provide stronger support and respect for the armed forces.
National security is difficult to safeguard if military personnel lack a reliable sense of mission and professionalism.
In the process of judging and responding to the Yoon Suk Yeol administration’s declaration of martial law as improper, the current administration’s punishment of a number of senior military commanders may, in the author’s assessment, have had the effect of weakening morale and cohesion within the South Korean armed forces.

The south Koreans should ensure that their government does not disregard the military, while at the same time demanding that the armed forces devote themselves intentively to preparing to fight and win when necessary.
National security, like human life itself, is too important to permit even a moment of complacency. The military, the government, and the South Kordan people must work together as one, preparing even for worst-case scenarios and making every effort to deter and defend against the threats posed by North Korea and its nuclear arsenal.
The recent North Korean landmine explosions in the  DMZ should be used as an opportunity to strengthen the security posture of the current Lee administration, the armed forces, and South Korean society as a whole.

※ The views expressed herein may differ from those of the Hansun Foundation.